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Does collective protest shift public opinion? Several recent 
studies demonstrate a causal effect. Most obviously, protest 
can induce more favorable attitudes to the cause (Andrews 
et al., 2016; Branton et al., 2015; Madestam et al., 2013; 
Tertytchnaya and Lankina, 2020; Wallace et al., 2014). 
Protest can also have the reverse effect, polarizing opinion 
(Motta 2018) or even eroding support for democracy 
(Ketchley and El-Reyyes, 2020). All these studies identify 
effects over the short term, from a few days to a few years. 
Mazumder (2018) is more ambitious, investigating whether 
Civil Rights protest in the early 1960s affected public opin-
ion early in the 21st century. He finds that “whites from 
counties that experienced historical civil rights protests are 
more likely to identify as Democrats and support affirma-
tive action, and less likely to harbor racial resentment 
against blacks” (Mazumder, 2018: 922). Dependent varia-
bles are derived from the Cooperative Congressional 
Election Study (CCES) in 2006 and 2008–2011. White 
respondents are aggregated by county. The key independent 
variable is a binary indicator for whether one newspaper 
reported any protest for Civil Rights between 1960 and 
1965. The main analysis controls for five county character-
istics measured in 1960 or before. Mazumder’s study com-
plements a burgeoning literature on the long-term legacy of 
political violence (Rozenas and Zhukov, 2019; Voigtländer 
and Voth, 2012). It also augments an established literature 
on the historical legacy of slavery, lynching, and anti-black 
mobilization in the American South (Acharya et al., 2016; 
Andrews, 1997; McVeigh et al., 2014).
This paper scrutinizes Mazumder’s findings. The key 
independent variable is subject to significant measurement 
error. The analysis omits a crucial predictor of protest and 
of racial attitudes: college education. When we include the 
proportion of adults with a college degree and the number 
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of students at the county level, along with other control 
variables from the original dataset, the effect of protest is 
reduced by about half. It is no longer statistically signifi-
cant in eight out of nine combinations of outcome varia-
bles and protest measures. When we analyze individual 
respondents, controlling for their education and other char-
acteristics, the county’s college education and student 
numbers in 1960 are still strongly associated with racial 
liberalism. In short, there is insufficient evidence to sup-
port any causal relationship between the incidence of Civil 
Rights protest and variation in whites’ racial attitudes in 
the early 21st century. Instead, the reanalysis demonstrates 
the importance of education in predicting social attitudes, 
at the contextual as well as the individual level. Our con-
clusion highlights two methodological lessons. First, 
causal inference should be paired with sustained historical 
inquiry that specifies plausible mechanisms. Second, sta-
tistical tests for sensitivity can induce complacency about 
the risk of confounding.
Measurement error and omitted 
variables
Mazumder’s key independent variable—the occurrence of 
protest at the county level—is derived from a single news-
paper, the New York Times. By contrast, other recent stud-
ies of the effects of protest utilize event data from multiple 
newspapers (Ketchley and El Reyyes, 2020), often com-
plemented by records from movement organizations 
(Madestam et al., 2013). The vast majority of protest 
events are never reported in the New York Times—a recent 
estimate is under 5% (Beyerlein et al., 2018). Therefore 
many counties will be erroneously classified as experienc-
ing no protest. The magnitude of this problem is indicated 
by comparing a comprehensive list of Southern states with 
sit-ins—where blacks physically occupied spaces from 
which they were excluded—during the spring of 1960 
(Andrews and Biggs, 2006; Biggs and Andrews, 2015). Of 
64 counties that experienced these especially disruptive 
and hence visible events, 20 had no Civil Rights protest of 
any kind reported by the New York Times over the same 
period. Sociologists who study the reporting of protest 
conclude that newspaper data have “very serious flaws” 
and so scholars “need to spend more time and print space 
thinking about how these shortcomings may affect their 
results” (Ortiz et al., 2005: 398). Mazumder’s Online 
Appendix provides a short paragraph which acknowledges 
a bias towards events involving arrests and violence. He 
argues that such bias will result in fewer events being 
reported in racially liberal areas, leading to an underesti-
mate of the effect of protest, but no data are presented 
to support this conjecture. In supplementary analysis, 
Mazumder uses an alternative measure: the number of pro-
test events reported by the New York Times. Unfortunately, 
one error is apparent upon inspecting Mazumder’s 
dataset. The county with the second highest number of 
events—89—is Madison, Mississippi, but we find only 
three events in this county in the original source (McAdam 
et al., n.d.). We focus on the dichotomous measure empha-
sized by Mazumder, but also show results for the number 
of events which we derive from the original source. We 
also use the total number of participants, which is more 
theoretically relevant and less subject to measurement 
error than the number of events (Biggs, 2018).
Mazumder’s main analysis includes five control varia-
bles: socioeconomic characteristics in 1960 and voting in 
presidential elections from 1932 to 1960. Eight variables 
are added in supplementary models (Online Appendix, pp. 
6–8).1 These variables are restricted to the 1960s or earlier; 
subsequent influences on public opinion are excluded. This 
is exceptional, for most studies of historical legacies include 
variables closer in time to the outcome variable.2 Estimates 
of the effect of slavery on whites’ racial attitudes, for exam-
ple, control for contemporary characteristics such as the 
black-white income ratio and the white unemployment rate 
(Acharya et al., 2016). The legacy of a medieval pogrom on 
Nazi anti-Semitism is estimated net of the town’s religious 
and occupational composition in 1933 (Voigtländer and 
Voth, 2012). By contrast, Mazumder assumes that any con-
temporary difference between counties that experienced 
protest and those that did not, which are not explained by 
these thirteen variables measured before 1970, are caused 
by protest. As he acknowledges, this is a “strong assump-
tion” (Mazumder, 2018: 927).
One notable omission from the analysis is a measure of 
college education. Students played a crucial role in the 
Civil Rights movement. The best predictor of whether a 
city in the South experienced sit-in protest in the spring of 
1960 is its number of black college students (Andrews and 
Biggs, 2006). College graduates, more generally, were far 
more likely to protest. By 1973, 14% of adults with a col-
lege degree had “ever taken part in a civil rights demonstra-
tion,” compared to 3% who never attended college (National 
Opinion Research Center, 1973). The pattern also held for 
African Americans (Harris, 1966). The Civil Rights move-
ment was not peculiar in this regard, for the association 
between college education and protest participation—
except for the labor movement—is an enduring finding in 
political sociology (Dalton et al., 2009; Schussman and 
Soule, 2005). Mazumder does include median years of 
schooling in supplementary models (Online Appendix A4). 
This variable’s correlation with the proportion of adults 
with college degrees is not high (r = .65), and its correlation 
with the number of college students (transformed by taking 
the square root) is low (r = .36). When we predict the occur-
rence of reported protest across counties, adjusting for 
Mazumder’s control variables and including fixed inter-
cepts for each state, median years of schooling is not statis-
tically significant but the number of college students has a 
large and statistically significant effect (Supplemental 
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Table S1). For a county with 100 students, the average 
adjusted predicted probability of protest is .06; with 25,000 
students, it is .62.
Given that Mazumder’s dependent variables derive from 
respondents’ answers to survey questions, it would be natu-
ral to include the respondents’ own characteristics as con-
trol variables—unless those characteristics are plausibly 
affected by protest in the 1960s. Such individual-level vari-
ables are included in other studies (Ketchley and El-Reyyes, 
2020; McVeigh et al., 2014), including the one from which 
Mazumder takes his dependent variables (Acharya et al., 
2016: Online Appendix B1). “To allow for more conserva-
tive inferences,” Mazumder (2018: 927) opts instead to 
aggregate respondents into counties and discards informa-
tion about their individual characteristics. One potentially 
important control variable is education, because college 
graduates express more liberal views on race (Schuman 
et al., 1997). Almost a third of white college graduates in 
CCES support affirmative action, compared to a quarter of 
those without. We examine how accounting for college 
education—as an individual characteristic and as contex-
tual variables—affects the results.
Reanalysis
For simplicity, we concentrate on one outcome variable: 
support for affirmative action. This is derived from a ques-
tion asked in all 5 years (albeit with variations in wording), 
whereas racial resentment comes from only 2 years and is 
inconsistent.3 Support for affirmative action more directly 
captures attitudes towards race than does identification 
with the Democratic party. As a preliminary test of college 
education, we repeat Mazumder’s analysis at the county 
level. Two points in the original analysis are noteworthy. 
Each observation is weighted by the number of respond-
ents. The county with the greatest weight (Maricopa, 
Arizona) counts 20,000 times more than the county with 
the least; half the overall weight is contributed by just 189 
counties. Each state has a fixed intercept, and so the analy-
sis effectively explains variation across counties within 
each state. For ease of presentation, we rescale all continu-
ous variables (including squared terms) by dividing by 
twice their standard deviation: the coefficient thus 
describes the effect of an increase by two standard devia-
tions (Gelman, 2008).4 Model 1 in Table 1 reproduces 
Mazumder’s result (with one correction, the elimination of 
a duplicate county).5 The occurrence of protest in the early 
1960s increases the proportion of whites supporting 
affirmative action by 2 percentage points.
Model 2 adds several more variables. Five socioeco-
nomic characteristics from the 1960 Census are taken from 
Mazumder’s supplementary analysis. Longitude and lati-
tude (with squared terms) are included “to flexibly control 
for spatial variation in the outcome” (Acharya et al., 2016: 
626). Support for affirmative action is higher in counties 
which in 1960 had less unemployment, fewer workers in 
Table 1. Determinants of whites’ support for affirmative action: counties.
Model 1 Model 2
 coef se p coef se p
Civil Rights protest, 1960–65 .020 .009 .03* .011 .007 .12
Democrat % of vote, 1932–60 –.011 .009 .24 –.008 .009 .36
Black % of population, 1960 –.030 .011 .01** –.037 .011 .00***
Urban % of population, 1960 .044 .012 .00*** .029 .011 .01**
Population, 1960—logged .004 .011 .73 –.007 .013 .58
Median income, 1959 –.028 .012 .02* –.083 .015 .00***
Agricultural % of labor force, 1960 –.051 .013 .00***
Unemployed % of labor force, 1960 –.020 .008 .02*
Median age, 1960 .021 .009 .02*
Median school years completed, 1960 .008 .013 .53
Overcrowded % of housing, 1960 .018 .010 .09
College educated % of adults, 1960 –.020 .019 .31
College educated % of adults, 1960—squared .044 .012 .00***
Number of college students, 1960—square root .017 .004 .00***
Longitude 1.119 .237 .00***
Longitude—squared 1.210 .242 .00***
Latitude –.302 .146 .04*
Latitude—squared    .312 .152 .04*
N  2,864   2,864  
Linear regression with fixed intercepts for each state, weighted by sum of respondents’ weights.
se: robust standard error; p: p-value (two-tailed), ***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05.
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agriculture, and more older people. We focus on our two 
new variables. The first is the proportion of adults with col-
lege degrees from the 1960 Census, along with its squared 
term. The effect is large and statistically significant (the 
joint hypothesis that both terms are zero is rejected at p < 
.001). Going from 5% to 15% of adults having graduated 
from college (from the 21st to the 96th percentile of 
respondents) increases support for affirmative action by 6 
percentage points.6 Our second new variable is the number 
of college students in 1960, transformed by taking the 
square root.7 The effect again is large and statistically sig-
nificant. Going from 100 to 25,000 students (from the 15th 
to the 94th percentile) increases support for affirmative 
action by 5 percentage points. When all these variables are 
included, the estimated effect of protest is reduced by 
almost half and is no longer statistically significant.
A legitimate question is whether the result depends on 
this particular set of independent variables (Young and 
Holsteen, 2017). We run 486 different models incorporat-
ing Mazumder’s five main control variables (Model 1) and 
every subset of the nine additional variables (Model 2), 
including alternative functional forms. For example, we try 
models with the square root of the number of college stu-
dents, models with the logarithm of this number, models 
with this number and its squared term, models with this 
number as a proportion of total population, and models 
without this variable. In all models, protest is estimated to 
have a positive effect, but the p-value never meets the con-
ventional threshold of significance: it ranges from .06 to 
.44, with a mean of .16 (the distribution is depicted in 
Supplemental Figure S1).
Table 2 summarizes results using alternative measures of 
protest, recalculated from the New York Times dataset: the 
number of protest events and the total number of partici-
pants in those events, each transformed (following 
Mazumder) by incrementing and taking the logarithm. 
Adding the variables in Model 2 reduces the coefficients by 
two-thirds and they are no longer statistically significant. 
The table also shows results for the other two outcome vari-
ables. (Supplemental Table S2 presents models measuring 
protest as binary.) Racial resentment is measured on a 1–5 
Likert scale and averaged by county; for comparability with 
the other two outcomes, we rescale it from 0 to 1. Adding 
the variables in Model 2 reduces the coefficient of protest—
however measured—by about half; it loses statistical sig-
nificance, with one exception. Whites express less racial 
resentment in counties that had a higher number of protest 
events in the early 1960s. Going from no reported protest to 
nine events (the 90th percentile) reduces average racial 
resentment by just over a quarter of a standard deviation. As 
Figure 1. Whites’ support for affirmative action, 2006–2011.
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a measure of protest size, however, the number of partici-
pants is more theoretically relevant and less subject to meas-
urement error (Biggs, 2018). Using this measure, protest has 
no statistically significant effect on racial resentment.
Moving from the aggregate to the individual level of anal-
ysis enables us to incorporate the respondent’s education and 
other characteristics. Respondents are more likely to have 
college degrees, of course, if they live in a county that had a 
high proportion of adults with college degrees in 1960. Table 
3 shows the results for almost 120,000 white respondents.8 
For comparability with aggregate analysis, we code affirma-
tive action as a binary variable and analyze it with linear 
regression. We include fixed intercepts for each state and 
each survey year; standard errors are adjusted for clustering 
by county (following Acharya et al., 2016: Online Appendix 
B1). Model 3 applies Mazumder’s original model to respond-
ents and yields almost identical results to Model 1.
Model 4 adds county-level variables from Model 2 along 
with basic individual characteristics: sex, age, education, 
income, and religion (following Acharya et al., 2016—
albeit substituting religion for religiosity). Women and 
younger people express greater support for affirmative 
action. Protestants (the reference category) are least likely 
to support affirmative action, while those with no religion 
or from non-Christian traditions are most likely. Support 
for affirmative action decreases with income. Education 
has a major effect, though it is not monotonic. People who 
only graduated from high school (the reference category) 
are least likely to support affirmative action. Those without 
a high school degree (7% of the total) are more likely to 
support affirmative action, as are those who attended a 
four-year college. For those with only a college degree, the 
probability of supporting affirmative action is higher by 6 
percentage points; for those with a postgraduate degree, it 
is higher by 17. Even after adjusting for the individual’s 
education, the proportion of adults in the county with a col-
lege degree in 1960 has a strong effect. Figure 1 shows the 
average adjusted prediction, with the 95% confidence inter-
val shaded; vertical lines indicate 10th, 50th, and 90th 
percentiles of the independent variable. Going from 5% to 
15% increases the probability of support for affirmative 
action by 4 percentage points. The effect of college stu-
dents in the county in 1960 is also strong. Going from 100 
to 25,000 students increases the probability by 3 percentage 
points. The inclusion of the contextual and individual vari-
ables shrinks the effect of protest to 1 percentage point, and 
it is no longer statistically significant.
Table 4 summarizes the results using alternative meas-
ures of protest. Adding the variables in Model 4 reduces the 
effect of protest on support for affirmative action by at least 
two-thirds and the coefficients are no longer statistically 
significant. The table also shows results for the other out-
come variables. (Supplemental Figures S2 and S3 depict 
the predicted effect of protest and our two key variables.) 
As before, the number of protest events has a statistically 
significant effect on racial resentment in Model 4, even 
though the effect’s magnitude is nearly halved. Out of nine 
combinations of three outcomes and three measures of pro-
test, eight yield no statistically significant effect.
Conclusion
According to Mazumder, whites who live in counties where 
Civil Rights protest occurred in the early 1960s—and was 
reported by the New York Times—are less likely to express 
racial resentment and more likely to support affirmative 
action and identify as Democrats. But Mazumder’s (2018: 
932) “exhaustive set of observable historical confounders” 
excluded college education—one of the strongest predictors 
of protest and of racial attitudes. Once we incorporate edu-
cation at the county level, along with basic contextual char-
acteristics, protest has no statistically significant effect on 
support for affirmative action or on identification with the 
Democratic party. The number of protest events does have a 
statistically significant effect on racial resentment, but the 
occurrence of protest does not and neither does the total 
number of protesters. The evidence, in sum, is far weaker 
than Mazumder reports. Our additional socioeconomic 
Table 2. Summary of results: counties.
Dependent variable Protest variable Model 1 Model 2 N
coef se p coef se p
Support for affirmative action Binary .020 .009 .03* .011 .007 .12 2,864
Support for affirmative action Event count—logged .015 .005 .00** .005 .004 .24 2,864
Support for affirmative action Total participants—logged .012 .005 .01* .003 .004 .42 2,864
Racial resentment Binary –.022 .009 .01** –.011 .007 .15 2,529
Racial resentment Event count—logged –.020 .004 .00*** –.012 .004 .00** 2,529
Racial resentment Total participants—logged –.015 .005 .00** –.007 .004 .09 2,529
Identification with Democrats Binary .028 .012 .02 .016 .009 .08 2,864
Identification with Democrats Event count—logged .020 .006 .00 .009 .006 .13 2,864
Identification with Democrats Total participants—logged .017 .007 .01 .007 .006 .20 2,864
Linear regression as in Table 1.
se: robust standard error; p: p-value (two-tailed), ***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05.
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Table 3. Determinants of whites’ support for affirmative action: respondents.
Model 3 Model 4
 coef se p coef se p
Civil Rights protest, 1960–65 .020 .009 .02* .011 .006 .09
Democrat % of vote, 1932–60 –.008 .007 .25 –.004 .006 .52
Black % of population, 1960 –.021 .007 .00** –.023 .007 .00***
Urban % of population, 1960 .042 .011 .00*** .018 .010 .08
Population, 1960—logged .008 .013 .55 –.003 .015 .85
Median income, 1959 –.027 .012 .02* –.063 .014 .00***
Agricultural % of labor force, 1960 –.027 .008 .00***
Unemployed % of labor force, 1960 –.016 .006 .01**
Median age, 1960 .015 .006 .02*
Median school years completed, 1960 .004 .011 .73
Overcrowded % of housing, 1960 .010 .007 .17
College educated % of adults, 1960 –.019 .022 .38
College educated % of adults, 1960—squared .052 .016 .00**
Number of college students, 1960—square root .030 .008 .00***
Longitude 1.171 .267 .00***
Longitude—squared 1.297 .275 .00***
Latitude –.344 .135 .01*
Latitude—squared .343 .137 .01*
Female .062 .004 .00***
Age –.113 .023 .00***
Age—squared .088 .022 .00***
Education: no high school .063 .011 .00***
Education: some college .019 .005 .00***
Education: 2-year degree .009 .007 .19
Education: 4-year degree .057 .005 .00***
Education: postgrad degree .173 .008 .00***
Income logged –.064 .005 .00***
Missing income –.027 .006 .00***
Religion: Catholic .024 .005 .00***
Religion: other Christian –.010 .008 .21
Religion: Jewish .125 .015 .00***
Religion: other .121 .008 .00***
Religion: none    .121 .006 .00***
N 118,450   118,450  
Linear regression, with fixed intercepts for each state and each survey year; respondents weighted.
se: robust standard error adjusted for clustering by county;
p: p-value (two-tailed), ***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05.
Table 4. Summary of results: respondents.
Dependent variable Protest variable Model 3 Model 4 N
coef se p coef se p
Support for affirmative action Binary .018 .008 .02* .011 .006 .09 118,450
Support for affirmative action Event count—logged .024 .008 .00** .008 .007 .25 118,450
Support for affirmative action Total participants—logged .019 .008 .02* .005 .007 .50 118,450
Racial resentment Binary –.017 .007 .01* –.009 .006 .12 49,956
Racial resentment Event count—logged –.029 .006 .00*** –.017 .006 .01** 49,956
Racial resentment Total participants—logged –.021 .008 .00** –.010 .007 .18 49,956
Identification with Democrats Binary .024 .010 .01 .015 .008 .06 118,375
Identification with Democrats Event count—logged .030 .010 .00 .013 .010 .18 118,375
Identification with Democrats Total participants—logged .026 .011 .02 .011 .010 .28 118,375
Linear regression as in Table 3.
se: robust standard error; p: p-value (two-tailed), ***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05.
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variables do not exhaust the factors that predict variation in 
the incidence and magnitude of Civil Rights protest and that 
also shape whites’ attitudes on race.
Our reanalysis does not, of course, show that the Civil 
Rights movement of the 1960s failed to affect whites’ racial 
attitudes. Indeed, we share Mazumder’s intuition that the 
movement had a powerful influence, even given the longer-
term decline in racist attitudes (Schuman et al., 1997). The 
problem is his assumption that the “intensity of the protest 
effect should be greater among areas more geographically 
proximate to the protest” (Mazumder, 2018: 927). This 
assumption makes sense in many historical contexts. High 
turnout in a city’s Tea Party rally, for example, mobilized 
right-wing activists who then affected local public opinion 
(Madestam et al., 2013). Sustained disruptive protest in 
Egypt after the 2011 revolution eroded support for democ-
racy among people living in the vicinity (Ketchley and 
El-Reyyes, 2020). This assumption is much less appropri-
ate for the Civil Rights movement, however.
In the South, protest actions were often not intended to 
persuade local whites to embrace racial equality. Many were 
intended to provoke violent repression that would shift pub-
lic opinion hundreds of miles away, outside the South, and 
which would in turn force the Federal government to inter-
vene (McAdam 1982). This strategy was used most famously 
by the Southern Christian Leadership Council in Birmingham 
and Selma, and it was deployed also in the Freedom Rides of 
1962 and the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee’s 
projects in Mississippi and southwest Georgia. Therefore the 
assumption that the effect of protest would remain geograph-
ically circumscribed—after five decades had elapsed—is 
implausible. In the elaboration of explanatory mechanisms, 
causal inference and sustained historical inquiry should 
be treated as methodological complements (Kocher and 
Monteiro, 2016). For the nascent literature on attitudinal 
consequences of protest, leveraging qualitative case detail 
will be vital for understanding the channels through which 
protest makes an impact.
There are two broader implications of our analysis. The 
first is substantive. We find that the overall proportion of 
adults with a college degree in the county has a large impact 
on individual attitudes, after adjusting for the individual’s 
own level of education. This reinforces recent studies dem-
onstrating similar contextual effects on attitudes to women 
and sexual minorities in England (Fielding, 2018) and on 
far-right voting in the Netherlands (Van Wijk et al., 2019). 
Whether such contextual effects are due to selective migra-
tion or to social influence remains an open question.
The second implication is methodological. Mazumder’s 
results are buttressed by a sensitivity test (Blackwell, 2014). 
It is deployed to argue for the implausibility of finding a 
confounding variable that could undermine the results; 
“such an unmeasured variable would have to explain more 
than twice the amount of variance in racial resentment 
than observed predictors such as urbanization, median 
income, and percent black” (Mazumder 2018: 929). In the 
equivalent of Model 1 for racial resentment, these five 
observed predictors together explain .006 of the variance. 
When added to this model, the square root of the number of 
college students explains .030 of the variance—five times 
more. Alternatively, adding the proportion of adults with 
college degrees (without the squared term) explains .051 of 
the variance—over eight times more.9 Indeed, this latter 
variable explains almost as much as all the state intercepts 
put together (.054). The lesson is that tests of statistical 
sensitivity cannot substitute for historical and theoretical 
understanding.
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Notes
1. The Online Appendix ostensibly “re-estimates the models 
from the main text” with additional variables, but actually 
omits the variable for total population. When this variable 
is included, the effect of protest exceeds the conventional 
threshold of statistical significance (p = .07 in Model 6).
2. Although adjustment for posttreatment variables is not 
appropriate for randomized experiments, it may be advisable 
for observational studies (Rosenbaum, 1984).
3. It is taken from a single question in 2010 but averaged from 
two questions in 2011.
4. Rescaling a variable does not affect its statistical signifi-
cance, of course, nor does it alter the coefficient of any other 
variable.
5. Mazumder omits many counties, including Virginia’s inde-
pendent cities (comprising 38% of the state’s population 
in 1960), Baltimore city, St Louis city, and Florida’s Dade 
county. We do the same for the purpose of replication.
6. Percentiles here and below are taken from the weighted dis-
tribution of respondents; 5% is the 21st percentile because 
21% of the sample live in counties where under 5% of adults 
had college education in 1960.
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7. Taking the square root is slightly inferior (AIC is worse by 5) 
to adding a squared term, but has the advantage of imposing 
a monotonic relationship.
8. Although Mazumder (2018: 922) refers to “[d]ata from over 
150,000 respondents,” the total number of whites in the 2864 
counties is 119,447 (excluding respondents with 0 weight). 
Our analysis omits individuals with missing values on any 
variable (except income)—0.8% of the total for affirmative 
action—and consequently omits two counties which are rep-
resented by a single respondent.
9. Adding the former variable more than doubles the variance 
explained by Mazumder’s five control variables and adding 
the latter more than triples the variance. Omitting important 
explanatory variables makes a model appear more robust to 
“unobserved” confounding.
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